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Abstract—Natural Disasters like hurricanes, floods or earth-
quakes can damage power grid devices and create cascading
blackouts and islands. The nature of failure propagation and
extent of damage is dependent on the structural features of the
grid, which is different from that of random networks. This
paper analyzes the structural vulnerability of real power grids
to impending disasters and presents intuitive graphical metrics
to quantify the extent of damage. Two improved graph eigen-
value based bounds on the grid vulnerability are developed
and demonstrated through simulations of failure propagation on
IEEE test cases and real networks. Finally this paper studies
adversarial attacks aimed at weakening the grid’s structural
resilience and presents two approximate schemes to determine
the critical transmission lines that may be attacked to minimize
grid resilience. The framework can be also be used to design
protection schemes to secure the grid against such adversarial
attacks. Simulations on power networks are used to compare the
performance of the attack schemes in reducing grid resilience.
I. INTRODUCTION
The topological structure of the power grid is an important
feature that affects the delivery of electricity [1]. From an
economic perspective, the capacity of transmission lines and
the graphical properties (whether tree-like or loopy) affect the
locational marginal electricity prices as well as the conver-
gence of Optimal power flow algorithms [2]. Insufficient line
capacities and network structure can lead to highly fluctua-
tion prices and even negative prices [3]. From an reliability
perspective, the grid structure influences the extent of damage
following an natural or man-made disaster. In particular, it
affects the propagation of failures after an initial breakdown
of equipment and thus in turn affects the formation of islands
and loss of service. Over the years, natural disasters like
earthquakes, floods, hurricanes have caused extensive power
outages due to damage of grid equipment and loss of network
connectivity [4], [5]. Such disasters also affect co-located in-
terdependent transportation and communication infrastructure
as well. Thus there is a greater need to quantify the effect of
the grid structure on failure propagation in the grid following
a natural disaster and to incorporate the insights gained into
transmission planning techniques to improve grid resilience.
There is existing work that studies the impact of structure on
grid reliability. Reference [6] describes a widely accepted and
realistic DC model for the propagation of equipment (nodes
and links) failures in cascading outages in the power grid.
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Here, the propagation process begins with an initial failure
of a network node or link which leads to a redistributing of
the power flows for optimal dispatch. This can lead to some
transmission lines running above their prescribed capacities
and subsequently tripping due to overheating. Subsequently
in [7], the authors incorporate recovery mechanism for the
tripped transmission lines into the failure model and show
that the size of blackout has a power-law distribution as seen
in reality. Reference [8] analyzes the problem of finding the
optimal k lines in the grid that can be used for interdiction
in the grid to create failures. Power Flow based analysis has
been done to analyze geographically correlated failures in [9].
Similarly, an interdiction based analysis on grid resilience
considering short term impacts is discussed in [25]. However,
these models include solving a Optimal Power Flow (OPF)
or similar optimization problem to study the propagation of
failures. Such an approach is harder to analyze. In particular,
it seldom leads to a closed form expression of a metric or
parameter that can quantify the resilience of the power grid
to failures. In a separate line of work, efforts have been made
to study probabilistic failure propagation in power grids and
related networks using techniques from percolation theory
and random graph theory. In this approach, initial failures
are supposed to propagate probabilistically from source to
neighboring nodes and edges in the grid graph before termi-
nating. The final state will often include greater number of
failures than the initial state and efforts are made to study
the effect of the grid structure in influencing the spread.
References [10], [30] study the effect of removing nodes
from power grid graphs based on their centrality and degree
measures and its effect on network connectivity. The authors of
[11] analyze the propagation of structural failures in complex
random networks based on similar neighborhood propagation
rules. This approach has been extended to study interdependent
networks failures as well [12] where nodes of two different
networks depend on one another for survivability. Similarly,
references [14], [15] have analyzed node and edge percolation
based techniques to understand failure propagation in random
graphs generated by stochastic geometry. An interaction graph
based model is presented in [19] where power flow based
cascading information is used to generate an interaction graph
for the network to study the inter-nodal dependencies on
cascades. A good review of works pertaining to grid resilience
to natural disasters can be found in [26].
It is worth mentioning that parallel analytical techniques are
also used in studying social, biological and cyber-networks for
information dissemination and spread of viruses [20], [21].
However, the accuracy of percolation based techniques and
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cascading failures is debatable [16]. Existing work [22], [23],
[24] has demonstrated that the structure of real power grids
as well as their finite sizes create significant deviations in
observed graph parameters from those predicted in random
graphs. This is because popular random network models like
Erdos-Renyi, Barabasi-Albert, small world and configuration
models [13] do not accurately capture the specific nature
of the spatio-temporal evolution of power grids. Further,
sharp breakdown thresholds emerge in analysis of topological
failure models on random graphs that are seldom observed
in simulations of failures on real grid graphs and IEEE test
cases [27]. Such thresholds arise due to the absence of local
loops and locally tree-like nature of random graph models
that are not encountered in real grids. Hence, it is fair to
suggest that analysis of random graphs to study the failure
propagation (both probabilistic and power flow based) will
not extend directly to real grids.
In this work, we focus on power grid failures induced by
large natural disasters like hurricanes and earthquakes that
create disconnected islands in the grid and loss of connectivity.
We study the size of the largest connected component in the
post-disaster grid and provide justification for using this as
a valid metric for grid vulnerability in modern power grids
and micro-grids that have non-trivial fraction of renewable
and other distributed generation resources. Note that prior
literature includes the use of the largest connected graph
component in simulation based studies of grid failures [18].
This is distinct from failure propagation models where a
failed node is considered to affect neighboring nodes with a
degree or physical characteristic based probability. We extend
probabilistic analysis previously used for random graphs on
known real grid graphs and popular IEEE test cases to de-
termine computable graphical parameters (Eg. eigenvalues of
the grid adjacency matrix) that can be used to quantize the
resilience of grids to such natural disasters. More importantly,
we present a modified graph construction based on the true
grid graph and use it to develop improved bounds on the
extent of damage created in the network by the disaster [1].
The efficacy of the graphical parameter based bounds and
soft thresholds are demonstrated by simulations of failures on
publicly available grid data-sets. We then use the graphical
metrics on grid resilience to identify critical transmission lines
(graph edges) that maximally affect the grid resilience. In
particular, we study attack on grid resilience by an adversary
that aims to damage a set of transmission lines to maximize the
expected damage to network connectivity following a natural
disaster. As this problem is NP-hard in general, we present
two approximate algorithms to determine the optimal edges in
the adversary’s target set. The first algorithm is based on per-
turbation based analysis of eigen-values of the grid adjacency
matrix while the second algorithm is based on greedy trace
minimization of a higher power of the adjacency matrix. The
performance of our algorithms for attack design in reducing
grid resilience is demonstrated through simulations and also
compared with other techniques in literature, notably attacks
on nodes with high betweenness [30] or random attacks.
From the system operator or grid controller’s perspective,
these algorithms can be used to determine the critical lines
that need to be protected to build resilience and prevent
further degradation of grid resilience before any impending
natural disaster. To summarize, our work presents a analytical
framework to quantify the resilience of real power grid graphs
to natural disasters and develops two algorithms to determine
the critical transmission lines that need to be protected to
improve grid resilience and prevent adversarial deterioration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we develop our intuitive graph theoretic quantification
of network resilience that is reasonable in the presence of local
generation. Next, we analyze network failures and resilience
in actual grid graphs without employing any assumptions from
random graph theory in Section III. In Section IV, we present
our novel modified graph construction and use it to develop
improved bounds on size of the network damage along with
simulation results on IEEE test cases and real power grids.
We study adversarial attacks on transmission lines aimed at
weakening grid resilience to natural disasters in Section V
and present our approximate greedy methods to determine the
critical transmission lines. Simulation results on our designed
algorithms and comparison with existing work is presented
in Section VI. Finally, we discuss the insights gained and
prospective future work in Section VII.
II. FAILURE MODEL IN POWER GRIDS
We begin by describing the power grid model and its
features.
Network Model: We consider a modern power grid (or mi-
cro grid) in this paper that has distributed generation resources
available on interior buses. Such generation may be provided
by renewables (solar, wind etc.) or by conventional resources.
We denote the grid by a graph G = (V,E), where sets V and
E represent the nodes/buses and the undirected edges/lines
respectively. Let the total number of buses in the system be N .
We assume that under normal operating conditions, the lines
have sufficient transmission capacity to transfer power from
one part of the network to another. We denote the adjacency
matrix of the graph G by AG that is assumed to be known and
not generated by a probabilistic model. Each edge (ij) in E
is represented by a value of 1 for A(i, j) and A(j, i) in the
binary adjacency matrix. As an example, the IEEE 14 bus test
system [27] is given in Figure 1.
Failure Model: As described in the Introduction, we con-
sider a natural disaster that causes equipment failures in the
grid. We assume that the natural disaster produces a proba-
bilistic failure on all nodes in the system, with independent
initial probability of failure denoted by p0. In this work, we
only consider cases where the initial probability of failure on
all nodes is the same. However, the entire analysis can be
extended to cases where different nodes suffer distinct prob-
abilities of initial failure. The initial failure rate p0 depends
on the nature of the natural disaster (Eg. earthquake scale,
wind speed of hurricane etc.) as well as on the geographical
placement of the grid (Eg. topography of the land will affect
the failure rate). Such probabilities, in practice, are computed
by agencies like the National Hurricane Center and used to
3Fig. 1. IEEE 14-bus test system [27]
Fig. 2. Initial Node Failure (j) and Secondary Node Failure (i)
predict the scale of damage and help in planning for evacuation
strategies [28]. As we are concerned with connectivity in the
network, we consider secondary failures in surviving nodes
that get separated from the rest of the network due to initial
failures in all of their neighboring nodes. This is shown in
Figure 2. Next we describe our measure of network damage
following the natural disaster.
Network Damage: As mentioned earlier, we assume that
transmission line capacities are sufficient to satisfy all load in
the system provided enough generating resources are online
and connected. Let Ns denote the size of the largest connected
component of surviving nodes after the disaster. We consider
N − Ns to be the measure of network damage caused by
the natural disaster. It is worth mentioning that outside of the
largest component, smaller groups of nodes can be functional
as well if enough generation is available to satisfy the total
load in the node group. We select N − Ns as the measure
of network damage as it has a key characteristic as described
next.
Let ∆Pi denote the net power capacity (generating capacity
minus load) of node i in the network, where nodal generating
capacity and load are both random variables. Consider the case
where each ∆Pi is an independent Gaussian random variable
with mean µ ≥ 0 and variance σ2. If node i is disconnected
from the rest of the network, the probability qi0 that its local
load is served is then given by:
qi0 = P(∆
P
i ≥ 0) =
∫ ∞
0
1√
2piσ2
e−(x−µ)
2/σ2dx
⇒qi0 = .5 +
∫ µ
0
1√
2piσ2
e−(x−µ)
2/σ2dx as µ ≥ 0 (1)
On the other-hand, if node i is connected to a group of Nk
nodes, the probability qiNk that node i satisfies its load is given
by:
qiNk = P(
Nk∑
i=1
∆Pi ≥ 0) = P(
Nk∑
i=1
∆Pi /Nk ≥ 0)
= .5 +
∫ µ
0
1√
2piσ2/Nk
e
− (x−µ)
2
σ2/Nk dx (2)
where Eq. (2) follows from the fact that ∑Nki=1∆Pi /Nk is a
Gaussian(µ, σ2/Nk) random variable. Note that its variance
decreases with increase in Nk, the size of the connected set
that node i belongs to. For 1 ≤ Nk ≤ Ns, using properties of
the exponential function it follows that∫ µ
0
1√
2piσ2/Nk
e
− (x−µ)
2
σ2/Nk dx ≤
∫ µ
0
1√
2piσ2/Ns
e
− (x−µ)
2
σ2/Ns dx
(3)
Using Eqs. (1), (2) and (3), we have qi1 ≤ qiNk ≤ qiNs .
Thus, the probability of a nodal load being served increases
with an increase in the size of the connected component that
the node belongs to. Thus the largest component shows the
highest group of nodes whose cumulative loads are satisfied
with highest probability. This justifies our usage of Ns (size
of the largest connected component of surviving nodes) to
quantify the functional network and correspondingly of N−Ns
to measure the scale of network damage. In the next section,
considering the largest component as the surviving network,
we analyze the effects of network structure on the extent
of failures and determine a preliminary upper bound on the
probability of initial failure p0 beyond which the network
fragments.
III. FAILURE ANALYSIS AND PRELIMINARY BOUND
As shown in Fig. 2, we consider initial failures and sec-
ondary failures in the grid and analyze their creation in discrete
steps. Let λVt denote the vector of survival probabilities of all
N nodes in set V at step t. For node i, we have λV0 (i) = 1−p0
where p0 is the initial probability of failure. According to the
failure model, node i survives at step t if it did not fail at step
t = 0 and did not get disconnected between steps 1 and t− 1.
In other words, at least one of its neighbors did not fail by
step t− 1. We express this mathematically as
λVt (i) = (1 − p0)P[
⋃
j:(ij)∈E
{node j survives at t− 1}]
⇒ λVt (i) ≤ (1 − p)
∑
j:(ij)∈E
λVt−1(j) (4)
⇒ λVt ≤ (1 − p)AGλVt−1 (5)
Here Eq. (4) follows from the Union Bound for probabilities.
Note that for a general graph G, this gives an inequality as
against an equality that is obtained for a random graph model
[12] where failure propagation from each distinct neighbor
is independent. This is a crucial distinction as real world
power grid graphs are not locally tree-like and have correlated
failure pathways unlike random graphs. Let βA be the largest
4Fig. 3. Each undirected edge results in two survival probabilities, one in
each direction
eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix AG . Using relation (5), we
have
(1 − p0)βA < 1, then λV∞ → 0 (6)
Thus, p0 > 1−1/βA provides a upper bound on the threshold
on initial probability of random failures (p0) beyond which the
grid fragments. In contrast, random graph analysis leads to an
exact threshold and not an upper bound. It is worth noting that
the current formulation does not specify the extent of damage
in the region p0 < 1 − 1/βA. In the next section, we present
a novel modified graph construction that overcomes this and
helps generate tighter bounds.
IV. MODIFIED GRAPH FOR IMPROVED BOUNDS
Note that in our failure model, the survival of any node
depends on the existence of edges connecting it to the largest
connected component. Indeed we can analyze a node’s sur-
vivability by considering the probability of it being connected
through operational edges in the grid graph. To motivate this
approach better, consider two connected neighboring nodes i
and j as shown in Fig. 3. Let BEt (ij) be the event that node i
is connected to the surviving nodes in the largest component
through edge (ij) at step t. Let the probability of BEt (ij)
be denoted by λEt (ij). Note that this event can be defined for
every neighboring node of node i and i’s survivability requires
at least one event to be true. Thus, the probability of node i
surviving at step t is given by:
λVt (i) = (1− p0)P[
⋃
j:(ij)∈E
[BEt (ij)] (7)
Here, the (1 − p0) arises from the probability of node i sur-
viving an initial failure, while the remaining terms correspond
to the survivability due to a connecting edge. In a similar
way, we define event BEt (ji) of probability λEt (ji) for node
j surviving through the edge with node i. This event is the
reciprocal of BEt (ij). Thus, every edge gives rise to two
probabilities of survival, one along each direction as shown
in Figure 3. If nodes i, j and k are connected as shown in
Fig. 3, the event BEt (ij) (node i surviving via edge (ij))
depends on BEt (jk) (node j surviving through edge (jk)). In
terms of their probabilities, λEt (ij) and λEt−1(jk) are related.
Extending to other nodes in the system, we write this relation
Fig. 4. Modified graph GE formation from G
mathematically ∀i, j such that (ij) ∈ E as
λEt (ij) = (1− p0)P[
⋃
k:(jk)∈E,k 6=i
BEt−1(jk)]
⇒ λEt (ij) ≤ (1− p0)
∑
k:(jk)∈E,k 6=i
λEt−1(jk) (Union Bound)
(8)
In Eq. (8), the (1−p0) comes from the fact that if node j fails
initially, then node i cannot survive through edge (ij). Eq. (8)
is the motivation behind our construction of a modified graph
based on the power grid graph to better estimate the scope of
network failures.
Modified Graph Construction: We create modified di-
rected graph GE from the original graph G as follows
• Each edge (ij) in E gives rise to two nodes vij and vji
in GE .
• Two nodes vab and vcd in GE are connected by an edge
directed from vab towards vcd if b = c and a 6= d (see
Figure 4).
Note that GE is similar in structure to a line graph of grid
graph G. However, there is a slight difference in that GE has
lesser number of edges as a pair of nodes vab and vba are not
neighbors in GE , though they would be in a standard line graph
construction. The number of nodes in GE is equal to twice the
number of edges in G. The size of AE , the adjacency matrix
of GE , is 2|E| × 2|E|. We now write Eq. (8) in a vector form
similar to Eq. (5) using the adjacency matrix of the modified
graph GE as follows:
λEt ≤ (1− p0)AEλEt−1 (9)
Here each node in the modified graph is associated with one
probability of failure that represents directional connectivity
by the corresponding edge in the original graph G. Extending
the analysis in the previous section to Eq. (9), it follows that if
βAE (the largest eigenvalue of AE) satisfies p0 > 1− 1/βAE ,
then the grid disintegrates as λE∞ → 0 and λV∞ → 0. Thus,
1− 1/βAE provides a second upper bound on the threshold
on p0, beyond which the grid fragments. We compare the first
upper bound 1 − 1/βA in (6) and the second lower bound
1− 1/βAE of IEEE test-cases and real grids and observe that
in all cases the second upper bound is smaller in magnitude
and hence provides an improved tighter bound on the failure
threshold. The comparisons are noted in simulation results
later in this section.
We now use the modified graph GE and Eq. (7) to analyze
the extent of damage in the grid. In particular, we are interested
5in bounding the size of number of failures over the entire
range of initial probability of failure p0, even below the bounds
derived earlier. For this, we use the basic failure definition
where a node fails eventually if either it fails initially or if it
does not get connected to the largest component through any
of its edges. In other words, the probability of not surviving
(given by 1 − λVt (ij) for node i in graph G) depends on the
probability of initial failure and on the probability that none
of the neighbors of node vij in GE survives. Let [BEt (ij)]c
denote the event of node i not surviving through edge (ij).
Mathematically, we have
1− λVt (i) = p0 + (1 − p0)P[
⋂
j:(ij)∈E
[BEt−1(ij)]
c] (10)
≤ p0 + (1 − p0) min
j:(ij)∈E
(1− P[BEt−1(ij)]) (11)
≤ p0 + (1 − p0)
∑
j:(ij)∈E
1− λEt−1(ij)
di
(12)
where di is the number of neighbors of node i in G. Eq. (10)
follows from the failure definition where p0 denotes the initial
failure probability for original node i. Eq. (11) follows from
P[A ∩ B] ≤ min(P[A],P[B]) while Eq. (12) follows from
the fact that the minimum of a set of numbers is less than
their average. Likewise, we express (1 − λEt (ij)) for failure
probabilities in the modified graph as below.
1− λEt (ij) = p0 + (1− p0)P[
⋂
k:(jk)∈E,k 6=i
[BEt−1(jk)]
c] (13)
≤ p0 + (1− p0)
∑
k:(jk)∈E,k 6=i
1− λEt−1(jk)
dij
(14)
where dij is the number of neighbors of node vij in modified
graph GE . Writing it in vector form for t→∞, we get
1− λE∞ = p0(I2|E| − (1− p0)D−1E AE)−1 (15)
where I2|E| is the identity matrix of dimension 2|E| (number
of nodes in GE). DE is the diagonal matrix of node degrees
(dij) in GE , while AE is its adjacency matrix. The upper
bound on the expected number of node failures in the gird
(Nf ) is then given by:
Nf =
N∑
i=1
(1 − λV∞(i)) ≤ p0N + (1− p0)1TD−1G AG(1− λE∞)
≤ p0N + (1− p0)
N∑
i=1
∑
j:(ij)∈E
1− λE∞(ij)
di
(16)
Using Eqs. (15) and (16), the upper bound on node failures
can be computed. If there are nodes in G with unit degree
(a common observation in power grids), the upper bound on
number of failures will be non-trivial. To demonstrate the
performance of our bounds, we present simulations of random
failures on known power grid graphs.
A. Comparison of Bounds through simulations
The performances of the upper bound on network failure
over all values of p0 and the two upper bounds on critical
value of p0 beyond which the network disintegrates are shown
through simulations on the IEEE 118 and 300 bus test systems
[27] in Figs. 5 and 6 respectively. Subsequently we also
consider publicly available power grid topologies pertaining to
the Western US grid and the grid under the Union for Coordi-
nation of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) in Europe. The
Western US grid has 4941 nodes and 6594 edges [31] while
the power grid of the UCTE has 1254 buses and 1811 lines
[32]. Failure propagation simulation and determined bounds
for these networks are shown in Figs. 7 and 8.
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In all the power grid cases, we consider the grid to have
fragmented if the size of the largest connected component of
surviving nodes is less than 2 logN , where N is the initial size
of the network. Note that the second upper bound (1−1/βAE)
on the threshold on p0 (initial probability of failure) derived
from the modified graph is lower and hence tighter than the
first upper bound (1− 1/βA) derived using the original graph.
Further, it needs to be pointed out that the upper bound on the
number of failures given by Eqs. (15) and (16) is tighter for
higher values of p0 compared to smaller values. The original
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power grid
graph does not provide a non-trivial upper bound on failures
over the entire range of p0, hence the modified graph has two
distinct advantages in failure analysis.
In the next section, we discuss how our measures of network
reliability based on eigenvalues can be used to determine
critical transmission lines that may be attacked by an adversary
interested in weakening the grid resilience to natural disasters.
V. CRITICAL LINES FOR ADVERSARIAL ATTACK ON GRID
RESILIENCE
We consider an adversary that aims to maximally weaken
the grid structure to make it more vulnerable to failures during
natural disasters. The adversary does so by attacking and
removing a fixed number (kmax) of transmission lines in
the grid. As mentioned in prior sections, relations involving
the eigenvalues of adjacency matrix of the grid graph or the
modified graph provide upper bounds on the probability of
failure beyond which grid connectivity diminishes greatly. In
the remainder of this section, we focus our attention on the
first upper bound (1−1/βA) in Eq. (6), where βA is the largest
eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix AG of the grid graph G.
We thus formulate the adversary’s objective as damaging kmax
edges in the graph to minimize βA to reduce the first upper
bound. Techniques based on the second upper bound based on
the modified graph in Eq. (9) will be the focus of our future
work in this area.
Let normalized eigenvector u1 correspond to the largest
eigenvalue βA of adjacency matrix AG . By definition u1
satisfies
max
‖x‖2=1
xTAGx = u
T
1AGu1 = βA (17)
The Perron-Frobenius theorem [34] states that eigenvector u1
is a positive vector. Using this fact with Eq. (17), it is clear that
removing edges from graph G (or deleting 1s from AG) always
leads to a reduction in the magnitude of its largest eigenvalue.
Hence, the adversary’s attack consists of determining the
critical edges that will enable the maximal reduction in the
largest eigenvalue of AG . This is a known NP-hard problem.
Here, we present two approximate techniques to determine the
critical lines that will be included in the adversary’s target set.
Eigen-Perturbation based Attack Design: In this attack
scheme, we use perturbation analysis [34] to approximate
the change in eigenvalues of adjacency matrix AG following
removal of edges and subsequently to determine the optimal
transmission lines to attack. Let the new adjacency matrix of
the grid after removal of edges be given by AG −∆AG . The
change in adjacency matrix ∆AG has the following structure:
∆AG(i, j) =
{
1 if edge (ij) ∈ E is removed,
0 otherwise,
(18)
Let the largest eigenvalue of new adjacency matrix be β∆A .
From Eq. (17), we have
β∆A = max
‖x‖2=1
xT (AG −∆AG)x
⇒β∆A ≥ u1T (AG −∆AG)u1 = βA − u1T∆AGu1
⇒∆βA = βA − β∆A ≈
∑
removed (ij)
2u1(i)u1(j)( using(18))
(19)
where ∆βA denotes the change in the maximum eigen-value
following the removal of lines.
The optimal transmission line whose removal approx-
imately minimizes the maximum eigenvalue of the adja-
cency matrix is thus given by maximizing the expression in
Eq. (19). To determine the optimal kmax lines, the adversary
iteratively computes u1, the eigenvector corresponding to the
largest eigenvalue, removes line by maximizing Eq. (18) and
recomputes the adjacency matrix and its principal eigenvector.
As shown later, the iterative scheme provides a far greater
reduction in grid resilience than selecting the kmax lines to
maximize Eq. (18) all at once, though it leads to an increase
in computational complexity.
Complexity: The computation of the eigenvector u1 takes
O(N3) steps via Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of AG
[33]. Given that the maximization of Eq. (19) takes |E| steps
which is less than O(N3), computing the kmax critical lines by
7iteratively computing the eigenvector for the largest eigenvalue
has a complexity of O(kmaxN3)[33]. If all lines are selected
based on a single computation of u1, the complexity is O(N3)
due to SVD. Next we describe another technique for attack
design that depends on trace minimization.
Trace Minimization based Attack Design: The trace of
a matrix refers to the sum of its diagonal elements and is
equal to the sum of its eigenvalues [34]. Consider an even
2rth power of the trace of the adjacency matrix AG . As the
eigenvalues of A2rG are the 2rth powers of the eigenvalues
(β1 = βA, β2, ..., βN ) of AG , we have the following relation
for the trace
trace(A2rG ) =
N∑
i=1
β2ri = β
2r
A (1 + (
β2
βA
)2r + ...+ (
βN
βA
)2r)
(20)
⇒ trace(A2rG )/β2rA ≈ 1 as r →∞ (21)
Here βA = βi is the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix.
Note that as | β2βA | < 1, if we take higher values of r, the ratio of
eigenvalues becomes smaller in Eq. (20). Thus for extremely
large values of r, the largest eigenvalue and trace of the 2rth
power of AG are approximately equal as noted in Eq. (21). In
this approach, thus we focus on reducing the trace of A2rG by
removing lines instead of minimizing the largest eigenvalue
βA or its higher power. Finding the optimal set of kmax edges
to minimize the trace of A2rG is computationally hard as well,
however using trace minimization has certain advantages as
we discuss now.
Theorem 1. The trace of A2rG , where AG is the adjacency
matrix of grid graph G is a supermodular function of the
constituent edges in the graph.
A real-valued function f defined over set S is supermodular
[35] if f(A⋃C) ≥ f(B⋃C) for B ⊂ A and A,B,C are
subsets of S. In other words, the returns due to addition of C
are not diminishing.
Proof: Note that the ith diagonal element in A2rG is equal
to the number of cycles of length 2r that begin and end at node
i. This can be shown by direct checks or by mathematical
induction. Here, cycle of length 2r refers to a graph path
with 2r hops (repetition allowed) that begins and ends at the
same node. Thus, the trace (sum of the diagonal elements
of A2rG ) is given by the total number of cycles of length 2r
that can be formed on all nodes in the grid graph. To show
supermodularity of trace of A2rG as a function of graph edges,
it is sufficient to show that the increase in the number of cycles
of length 2r in graph G after adding a new edge (ij) is less
than the increase observed if edge (ij) is added after inclusion
of another edge (lm). This increase is indeed true as presence
of an edge (lm) prior to the addition of edge (ij) will permit
the existence of additional cycles that includes both edges (lm)
and (ij), and cannot exist without (lm). Hence trace of higher
power of the adjacency matrix is a supermodular function of
the graph edges.
It is a known property [35] that greedy minimization of a
supermodular function is equivalent to greedy maximization
of a submodular function and is provably at least 1 − 1/e
(≈ 63%) close to the optimal solution. Thus, the adversary’s
attack policy in this scheme is to greedily remove kmax edges
that minimizes the trace of 2rth power of the adjacency
matrix of the grid graph.
Complexity: The 2rth power of the symmetric adjacency
matrix is computed efficiently using Singular Value Decom-
position (SVD) as A2rG = Uβ2rA UT where columns of U are
the eigenvectors and β2rA is the diagonal matrix with 2rth
powers of the eigenvalues. Note that matrix multiplication
and SVD are computed in O(N3) while computing β2rA takes
complexity O(N log r). Since we greedily minimize the trace,
the selection of one edge takes O(|E|(N3 + N log r)). The
overall complexity of computing kmax optimal edges by this
scheme is thus O(kmax|E|(N3 + N log r)). This expression
implies that increasing r to improve the accuracy of this
approach will at most lead to a logarithmical increase in the
complexity.
Resilience: From the grid controller’s perspective, these two
techniques can be used to determine the critical transmission
lines for enhancing security and reinforcement to prevent
adversarial manipulation aimed at disrupting grid resilience
to natural disasters. In the next section, we look at the
performance of these two approaches as an adversarial tool.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
We consider both approaches (eigen perturbation and trace
minimization) for determining the optimal kmax edges to min-
imize the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of the grid
graph and thereby reduce the resilience of the grid to natural
disasters. For comparison, we consider two alternate schemes,
one where an adversary removes edges randomly, and another
where an adversary removes edges in the decreasing order of
their betweenness centralities [30]. We plot our results for the
IEEE 118 and 300 bus test systems and the UCTE power grid
network in Figs. 9, 10 and 11 respectively. Note that both
algorithms outperform random and betweenness based attacks
to reduce the eigenvalues. It can also be noted that iterative
eigen perturbation reduces the largest eigenvalue further than
edge removal based on a single perturbation computation as
mentioned in the previous section. Further, it can be observed
from Figs. 9 and 10 that increasing the value of 2r, the
power of the adjacency matrix, leads to an improvement in
the trace minimization based scheme as it approximates the
largest eigenvalue better as noted in Eq. (21).
VII. CONCLUSION
We analyze topological vulnerability of power grids to
probabilistic failures introduced by natural disasters in this
paper. We present intuitive evidence that in modern grids and
micro-grids where distributed generation resources are present,
a reasonable metric of damage is given by the size of the
largest connected component in the post-event grid graph.
We analyze the evolving failure process that originates at
nodes with initial failures. Based on the largest eigenvalue
of the adjacency matrix of the grid, we present an upper
bound on the critical probability of node failures beyond which
the grid fragments. Further, we present the construction of a
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Fig. 9. Comparison of adversarial schemes to reduce maximum eigenvalue
of grid adjacency matrix in IEEE 118 bus test system.
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Fig. 10. Comparison of adversarial schemes to reduce maximum eigenvalue
of grid adjacency matrix in IEEE 300 bus test system.
modified graph to analyze the probabilistic failures and use it
to generate a tighter upper bound on the critical probability.
This modified graph construction also enables us to derive
new non-trivial upper bounds on the expected number of
total failures for all values of the initial failure probability.
We present the performance of our derived analytical bounds
through simulations on two IEEE test cases and two real
grid data sets. Finally, we discuss adversarial attacks on the
power grid aimed at damaging transmission lines to minimize
the grid’s resilience to natural disasters. We develop two
approximate algorithms to identify the critical lines that will
enable such adversarial attacks. The first algorithm is based
on perturbation analysis of the eigenvalues of the adjacency
matrix and the second algorithm is based on greedy minimiza-
tion of the trace of a higher power of the adjacency matrix. We
analyze both algorithms and their complexity and demonstrate
their performance against random and centrality based attacks
studied in literature through simulations. Potential areas of
future work include improving the bounds and developing a
framework to incorporate topological analysis into power flow
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Fig. 11. Comparison of adversarial schemes to reduce maximum eigenvalue
of grid adjacency matrix in UCTE power grid.
based studies on grid vulnerability to enhance its practical
contribution.
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